CHICAGO DOWNS ASSOCIATION, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. DENNIS R. CHASE, DOING BUSINESS AS SPORTS ACHIEVEMENTS ASSOCIATION,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Nos. 90-2078, 90-2672. United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued May 17, 1991. Decided September 26, 1991.
Thomas D. Nash, Jr. (argued), Nash Lalich, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.
Wayne F. Plaza (argued), Edward Dismukes, Rooks, Pitts Poust, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois.
Before COFFEY, MANION and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
MANION, Circuit Judge.
2.
Even if we were to decide this case on Rule 60(b) principles, Chase would not likely prevail under Seventh Circuit precedent and on the record before us.
In Daniels this court held that "Because of an interest in finality . . . [r]elief under Rule 60(b) is warranted `only upon a showing of
extraordinary circumstances that create a substantial danger that the underlying judgment was unjust.'" Daniels, 887 F.2d at 790 (quotingMargoles v. Johns, 798 F.2d 1069, 1073 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 905, 107 S.Ct. 2482, 96 L.Ed.2d 374 (1987)). The record before us
now reflects that Chase was consulted about Royce's legal problems, yet nevertheless retained his services. As we noted earlier, this is the only record
reference we have regarding Chase's satisfaction with Royce. We do not believe that a party's decision under conditions of candid disclosure (which
ultimately turns out to be a bad decision) is the kind of "extraordinary circumstance" that justifies disturbing a decision's finality.
Even despite his (erroneous) belief that a Rule 60(b) motion cannot be entertained by the district court after a notice of appeal has been filed, Chase
nevertheless argues that it would have been futile for him to have filed a Rule 60(b) motion in this case. Chase indicated in his brief and at oral
argument that he believed the court would not have been inclined to grant a Rule 60(b) motion due to its bias against Royce (and his misfortunes) and
consequently Royce's client. We are unfamiliar with any precedent which relieves a party from making every valid argument and motion before the district
court simply because of the slim possibility of that argument's or motion's success. In fact, based on the record, we are not persuaded that the district
judge in this case was adversely biased toward Royce or Chase. The judge on a number of occasions took time during the various hearings to express his high
regard for attorney Royce, and his sympathy for Royce's personal legal ordeal which was the possible reason for his inattention to Chase's claim. A large
number of accommodations throughout this "litigation" were made by the district court judge "in consideration" for Royce's "difficulties;" it seems likely
from the record that the judge would have been amenable to hear this case anew if the parties had counsel who were less distracted. In any event, a party's
suspicion of the unlikelihood of a motion's success does not spare him from having to make the motion before the district court in order to have the merits
of such motion examined on appellate review.
Lastly, we review the district court's order permitting Chicago Downs' registration of the judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963 in other districts.
Section 1963 states:
A judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property entered in any district court or in the Court of International Trade may be registered by
filing a certified copy of such judgment in any other district or, with respect to the Court of International Trade, in any judicial district, when the
judgment has become final by appeal or expiration of the time for appeal or when ordered by the court that entered the judgment for good cause shown. A
judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like manner.
A certified copy of the satisfaction of any judgment in whole or in part may be registered in like manner in any district in which the judgment is a lien.
The judgment in this case is on appeal, making registration possible only "when ordered by the court that entered the judgment for good cause shown." We
noted in Pacific Reinsurance Management Corp. v. Fabe, 929 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1991), that the "good cause" language "entered
the statute in 1988 to deal with the anomaly that a judgment for which no supersedeas bond had been posted was enforceable during appeal only in the
rendering district." Id. at 1218. We have recently held in Trustees of Chicago Truck Drivers v. Central Transport, Inc., 935 F.2d 114 (7th Cir. 1991): "[f]indings under § 1963, like *372 the
decision to require or excuse the filing of a [supersedeas] bond pending appeal, affect only the collection of a judgment. A court with jurisdiction to
authorize execution if the appellant does not post a bond — power a district court possesses during an appeal — also may make the findings that under §
1963 authorize execution in another district. The statute calls on a district judge to make `good cause' findings while an appeal is pending[.]" Id. at 120.
In the present case, Chicago Downs' motion to register the judgment in other districts during the pendency of appeal noted that Chase owns no property in
the district in which the deciding district court sits, that Chase does own substantial property in other districts, that Chicago Downs fears that Chase
can and may transfer or conceal such property otherwise necessary to satisfy the judgment if given time to do so, that registering judgment will forestall
his ability to do so, and that Chase declined the possible alternative of posting a supersedeas bond. The district court found in the absence of a bond
that the conditions set forth in Chicago Downs' motion constituted "good cause" for registration of the judgment in other districts under § 1963. This was
not an abuse of discretion. Cf. Associated Business Tel. Sys. v. Greater Capital, 128 F.R.D. 63 (D.N.J. 1989). 3
3.
The court in Associated Business noted: "In the instant matter, we conclude that `good cause' exists to allow plaintiff to register its judgment
in Illinois and elsewhere. As explicitly addressed in the commentary to the 1988 amendment [to § 1963], good cause can be shown `upon a mere
showing that the defendant has substantial property in the other [foreign] district and insufficient in the rendering district to satisfy the judgment.'
Siegal, Commentary to 1988 Revision, 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (West Supp. 1989)." (Emphasis added.) Associated Business, 128 F.R.D. at 68.
For all the foregoing reasons the decision of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
